Since the inception of their first model, Kellman and colleagues proposed an identity hypothesis, which states that modal and amodal completion share an identical boundary completion mechanism. They proposed a feed-forward model that was primarily driven by contour interpolation and asserted that the perceived differences in appearance of modal and amodal completion arise from subsequent processing. In the early versions of their model (Kellman & Shipley, 1991) , interpolation was initiated on the basis of certain image properties-contour relatability and tangent discontinuities-whereas their most recent model (Kellman, Garrigan, & Shipley, 2005) asserts that contour interpolation occurs in a 3-D representational space that contains information about relative depth. Although their new model proposes that contour completion occurs in a medium that contains all of the information needed to distinguish modal and amodal contours from the outset-relative depth- Kellman et al. (2005) upheld their claim that no distinction between these two types of completion occurs until some subsequent processing modifies early identical responses. The importance and prevalence of boundary interpolation in Kellman and colleagues' model has grown during the past 15 years, to the point where they now claim that all relatable contour segments are initially interpolated, and inappropriate connections are subsequently eliminated once other information is used to determine whether such connections should have been formed in the first place. Albert (2007) rejected this feed-forward model but argued that existing data do not warrant a rejection of the identity hypothesis.
A number of issues shape my objection to the model proposed by Kellman et al. (2005) . One questions why the visual system would use such an inefficient method of processing, generating a plethora of spurious connections that only have to be removed at a subsequent stage of processing. A second concern is the incompatibility of this model with existing data. A number of documented phenomena contradict the predictions of Kellman and colleagues' model. Some of the most notable failures include the absence of interpolated contours appearing when their model predicts they should, changes in the number and shapes of units and contours that arise during modal-amodal shifts, and changes in the shapes of boundaries that arise during modal and amodal transformations of otherwise identical images. In their reply, Kellman et al. (2007) contended that there is no reason to abandon the identity hypothesis. Both Kellman et al. (2007) and Albert (2007) relied heavily on two types of displays to uphold this assertion: crossing interpolations displays, where they assert that modally interpolated contours switch to an amodal appearance, and crystalline interpolation displays, where percepts of illusory glass surfaces are generated by displays that do not satisfy the luminance conditions for occlusion or transparency. I share the view that such phenomena can provide valuable insight into the mechanisms underlying completion phenomena and discussed the latter at length in numerous articles previously (Anderson, 1997 (Anderson, , 2003 Anderson & Julesz, 1995) . However, I disagree that these phenomena provide support for the identity hypothesis. Indeed, as I show below, variants of the crossing interpolations display provide some of the simplest and most direct evidence against their model. I also show that the glass percepts elicited by crystalline stereograms do not contradict any of the arguments that I have made about camouflage. Indeed, I show that these percepts are fully explained by the theory of occlusion, transparency, and lightness that I have articulated previously (Anderson, 1997 (Anderson, , 2003 .
Although Kellman et al. (2005) suggested that the move from a 2-D to a 3-D medium for completion most likely requires a radical change in models of completion, 1 the model that they presented contains no such changes. I agree that radical changes of a 2-D model are needed when considering the problem of completion in a representational medium containing information about relative depth. Indeed, this belief plays a significant role in motivating my involvement in this current debate. My colleagues and I have argued that inherent asymmetries in the information about surface structure specified by near and far luminance variations (such as edges or gradients) that impose inviolable constraints on the way surfaces and contours are represented. One of the core claims of work from my laboratory is that there are inherent (and some inviolable) differences in the ways that surface properties of relatively near and far objects are processed and represented, which includes modal and amodal completion or continuation as a subset. In particular, the differences that my colleagues and I have asserted underlie modal and amodal completion are a consequence of basic and fundamental differences between the way near and far features are processed that arise from constraints imposed by occlusion. We have argued that these constraints can cause substantial changes in the surfaces and contours that are interpolated in modal and amodal completion (or continuation) processes (Anderson, 2003 (Anderson, , 2007 Anderson, Singh, & Fleming, 2002) . Below, I show how these constraints are needed to understand a range of completion or continuation phenomena, including some of the examples that Kellman et al. (2007) and Albert (2007) take as counterexamples to my views.
Although the present debate has focused on a particular problem in midlevel vision, this debate entails a number of more general issues in theory construction. One of the most central issues in any psychological theory concerns whether a particular computation is separable from other processes that are known to contribute to the phenomena in question, that is, whether there are distinct computational modules of the type hypothesized by a particular model. Stated differently, a core issue when evaluating the veracity of a psychological theory is whether the hypothesized computational processes constitute the natural kinds (or natural decompositions) on which the functional architecture of the brain can be understood. At this level of description, the arguments that I raise in response to Kellman and colleagues' model (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Kellman et al., 2005) primarily object to their proposal that contour interpolation constitutes a separate, early module of early visual processing that is only modified by other known influences on completion and continuation phenomena after such contour interpolation processes have occurred. Albert (2007) also appears to have abandoned this sequential, modular view, but he nonetheless attempted to uphold some (unclear) view of a common mechanism. Although the issue of whether similar or identical mechanisms underlie completion may appear to be a relatively esoteric concern, the assertion of identity has some very strong implications about the computational architecture of visual processing. If processes are merely similar, then they can be influenced by other factors in potentially very distinct ways and therefore have very different architectures and functional organizations. However, if identity is assumed, then it asserts that at some stage of processing, two apparently different phenomena will engage these mechanisms in an indistinguishable manner. In Kellman and colleagues' model, identity is hypothesized to occur prior to other scene constraints, so some early cortical representations should reflect this hypothesized identity. I argue below that no data support this view and significant data contradict it.
When Predicted Boundary Completion Mechanisms Fail
One of the key demonstrations that shapes Kellman et al.'s (2007) reply involves a crossing interpolations display (see Figures  1 and 6 , pp. 489 and 497). Both Kellman et al. (2007) and Albert (2007) suggested this phenomenon provides strong evidence for an identical contour interpolation process. The ability of an interpolated contour, surface, or object to switch between completion types (i.e., modal and amodal) is easily understood with a model that asserts a common interpolation mechanism, so any clear evidence for such phenomena would provide at least suggestive support for a model of this kind. In the examples Kellman et al. (2007) and Albert (2007) cited, a contour that begins as a modally interpolated segment is claimed to switch into an amodal segment. But how would one know if completion is actually occurring in the amodal regions of these images as they claimed? By definition, amodal completion is perceptually invisible, so more than just a casual inspection of the figures is needed to uphold a claim that contours are interpolated in the amodal regions of these displays. My own experience of the figure yields what would be expected on the basis of a purely local induction mechanism: Illusory contours are generated at the binocular contour junctions, and they appear to degrade gracefully in strength as the distance from the initiating junction increases. Clearly, some additional data are needed to demonstrate that contour completion switches in the manner Kellman et al. (2007) and Albert (2007) suggested.
A more phenomenologically accessible test of the claim that interpolated contours can switch between a modal and an amodal appearance would use displays where the completion would be explicitly experienced if it occurred. The identity hypothesis predicts that the same mechanism underlies modal and amodal completion, so if one asserts that it is possible for modal and amodal 1 Kellman et al. (2005) stated, When 3-D considerations arise, there are several possible ways to incorporate them. One is to preserve an essentially 2-D approach and to add in some relatively external modifications or exceptions. Another is to generalize processes from a single frontoparallel plane to several or many such planes. Both of these approaches have the advantage of retaining 2-D operations and allowing direct links to known or likely characteristics of neural mechanisms in early cortical areas. A third approach is more radical. Processes and representations may rely on 3-D information in ways that cannot be realized in a 2-D framework with corrections.
The current theory of 3-D relatability and its supporting data and arguments imply that the third, radical approach is likely to be correct. (p. 606) segments to switch types, then the transition from one type ofcompeted segment to the other should work in either direction (as Kellman and colleagues have repeatedly asserted in their discussion of quasi-modal displays). This implies that a contour that begins as an amodal segment should be able to emerge from behind an occluder and form a modal contour. Both Albert (2007) and Kellman et al. (2007) only considered the modal to amodal transformation, where it is impossible to determine what is (or is not) interpolated behind an occluder by merely looking at the display. And here is where an unequivocal failure of the identity hypothesis can be observed: The predicted transition from an amodal to a modal segment simply does not occur (see Figure 1) . In these figures, small discs (or ovals) have been placed over the stereoscopic occlusion junctions (after Rubin, 2001 ). This manipulation occludes the binocularly unmatched features at the stereoscopic junctions that have been shown to induce local illusory contours (Anderson, 1994; Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Malik, Anderson, & Charowhas, 1999; cf. Nakayama & Shimojo, 1990) , and, without their presence, the perception of illusory contours is completely eliminated. Note that this manipulation does not impact any of the relevant image properties that Kellman et al. (2007) deemed necessary for initiating contour interpolation: All of these images contain relatable contour segments, tangent discontinuities, and the appropriate 3-D relationships. Yet no completion is observed. The vertical bars appear as disjointed segments, not completed bars, even when the smallest possible occluding elements cover the stereoscopic contour junctions ( Figure 1C ). I can see no way that the model proposed by either Kellman and colleagues or Albert (2007) can provide any explanation for the absence of completed contours in these displays. Indeed, this demonstration alone seems sufficient to reject the identity hypothesis proposed by Kellman and colleagues and retained by Albert (2007) .
Physiological Data Do Not Support the Identity Hypothesis
The core assertion of the identity hypothesis is that there is some processing stage where modal and amodal contours are interpolated identically prior to the influence of additional scene constraints (e.g., luminance relationships, border ownership). In other Figure 1 . Stereoscopic stimuli demonstrating the failure of the identity hypothesis in predicting completion. Cross-fusers should fuse the left two images, divergent fusers the right two images. Small occluding discs (A) or ovals (B and C) occlude the stereoscopic occlusion junctions (after Rubin, 2001 ). All of these images contain tangent discontinuities, relatable contour segments, and appropriate depth relationships, so they are predicted to initiate completion in Kellman and colleagues' model, but no completion is observed. The thin vertical bars in all of these images appear as disconnected contour segments that do not cross the gaps, not as connected bars.
words, the identity hypothesis asserts the existence of a stage where modal and amodal contours are actually represented identically. 2 Kellman and colleagues' model (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Kellman et al., 2005) is ultimately a statement about the sequence of processing stages in visual cortex and, hence, must ultimately be resolved by physiological data. And it is here that all of the extant evidence seems very much against the identity hypothesis. The first studies that demonstrated that early visual cortex (V2) responds to illusory contours used amodal contour stimuli as their control conditions, which generated significantly weaker responses than did modal contours (Peterhans & von der Heydt, 1989; von der Heydt, Peterhans, & Baumgartner, 1984) . More recently, Sugita (1999) showed that cells in V1 and V2 that respond vigorously to amodally completed bars respond much more weakly to modal variants that contained identical contour relationships. The modal stimuli used in Sugita's (1999) study did not satisfy the luminance conditions for camouflage, but Kellman and colleagues' identity hypothesis asserts that the early representations of contour interpolations are insensitive to such relationships, so these data are at odds with at least one of these claims. Lee and Nguyen (2001) and Bakin, Nakayama, and Gilbert (2000) also found substantial differences in the responses of cells in V1 and V2 to modal and amodal contours, so here again, no evidence supported the identity hypothesis. It is important to note that the only physiological data supporting an initially identical representation of modal and amodal stimuli was reported by Murray, Foxe, Javitt, and Foxe (2004) , who showed that EEG responses in the lateral occipital complex (LOC) and posterior parietal regions of cortex were initially identical for modal and amodal variants of Kanizsa figures. Although Kellman et al. (2007) cited this as strong support for their model, it is highly unlikely that the identical responses observed by Murray et al. (2004) have anything to do with contour interpolation processes (or at least not of the kind hypothesized in Kellman and colleagues' model). Stanley and Rubin (2003) found essentially identical modulation of LOC in response to standard Kanizsa stimuli and variants of these figures that did not contain either relatable contour segments or tangent discontinuities, the critical ingredients needed for contour interpolation in Kellman and colleagues' model. Moreover, whereas cells in early visual cortex (V1/V2) have small receptive fields that are known to respond to edges, cells in higher brain regions such as LOC have large receptive fields that often span both hemifields (Grill-Spector et al., 1998; Tootell, Mendola, Hadjikhani, Liu, & Dale, 1998 ; and see related arguments in Stanley & Rubin, 2003) , so it is unlikely that such regions can provide the computational substrate for the kind of interpolation processes hypothesized in Kellman and colleagues' model. Thus, the extant physiological data do not support the claim that modal and amodal contours are represented identically at any stage of visual cortex, which is the core assertion of Kellman and colleagues' identity hypothesis.
Luminance Constraints in Modal Completion
One of the recurring topics of debate concerns the role of luminance constraints in modal and amodal completion. My colleagues and I (Anderson, 1997 (Anderson, , 2007 Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Anderson et al., 2002) have argued that mechanisms of modal and amodal completion are not equally affected by luminance constraints, and we motivated this view by considering the ecological conditions that give rise to the problems of modal and amodal completion. In natural scenes, the need for modal completion (or continuation) arises because nearer surfaces are camouflaged by their backgrounds, which only occurs when a background matches the properties of a nearer, occluding surface. In contrast, there are no privileged luminance regimes that give rise to the problem of amodal completion (or continuation), as occlusion interrupts the projection of all distant surfaces. Note that these statements are about the ecological conditions that give rise to the computational problems of modal and amodal completion (or continuation); they are not statements that express inviolable constraints on completion mechanisms. In fact, we were quite careful to dissociate ecology from perception and to make it clear that the difference in ecological conditions "suggests the possibility that asymmetries [in perception] might be observed if the luminance conditions were not consistent with camouflage" (Anderson et al., 2002, p. 169) . This is the core misunderstanding that shapes both Kellman et al.'s (2007) and Albert's (2007) arguments regarding our claims about the role of luminance constraints on completion (Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Anderson, 1997; Anderson et al., 2002) . Both assert that we have claimed that modal completion should be blocked if the luminance conditions for camouflage are not met. This is an incorrect characterization of our position and does not take into account the fact that (to our knowledge) we were the first to construct stereoscopic displays showing that modal contour completion can occur even when the conditions for camouflage are not satisfied (Anderson, 1997 (Anderson, , 2003 Anderson & Julesz, 1995) . These displays (see Figure 2 ) are identical in all relevant respects to those depicted in Kellman et al.'s (2007) crystalline stereograms, although we described the percepts elicited by our displays as "glass" (Anderson & Julesz, 1995, p. 727) or "disembodied contour[s]" (Anderson, 2003, p. 796; see Figure 2 ). Thus, both Kellman et al. (2007) and Albert (2007) incorrectly characterized our theoretical views and attempted to reject our arguments about luminance constraints on the basis of this incorrect characterization. Kellman et al. (2007) actually conceded that luminance constraints play a role in affecting "the presence and salience of phenomenal contours in final scene representations" (p. 492), but they claimed that this occurs only after an initial stage where contours are represented identically. Albert (2007) rejected this view, suggesting that luminance constraints, as well as a number of other variables, exert their influence through feedback and are "simply factors that compete on a single playing field to influence contour interpolation" (p. 463). My colleagues and I (Anderson, 1997 (Anderson, , 2003 (Anderson, , 2007 Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Anderson et al., 2002) have not committed to a particular view as to whether luminance constraints influence contour completion through feed-back or whether they are used in the initial feed-forward flow of information. We have simply asserted that the mechanisms of modal completion are more strongly affected by photometric relationships than are amodal mechanisms, and I deny that there is any evidence to support the assertion that such influences occur only after a stage where modal and amodal contours are represented identically. What evidence is there to decide between these views?
With regard to physiology, currently data uphold a view that luminance constraints only impact completion after an initial computation where interpolated contours are represented identically (see especially Sugita, 1999) . So extant physiological data do not support Kellman and colleagues' model. Albert (2007) suggested that the initial feed forward flow of visual information in V1 and V2 might not clearly distinguish between the different types of contour interpolations and facilitation processes, whereas later activity, modulated by feedback from higher areas, might enforce more differentiated representations of modal contours, amodal contours, and collinear facilitation within different layers of early visual cortex. (p. 463) A host of ambiguities in this suggestion impact significantly on whether Albert's model actually embodies an identity hypothesis. One of the most significant is about the meaning intended by the terms early and later. Unlike some other aspects of Albert's proposals, this suggestion does not seem to be based on any existing physiological data. As Albert's (2007) own review of the literature reveals, no physiological data suggest that cells in V1 and V2 represent modal and amodal contours identically at any processing stage. Moreover, he suggested that the initial completion process does not arise from feedback, so, presumably, he is asserting that initial completion processes are driven by lateral interactions within these cortical areas. The problem with this suggestion is that feedback connections have been shown to be approximately an order of magnitude faster than lateral connections in V1 (Girard, Hupé, & Bullier, 2001) , which implies that if a contour completion process exists, the earliest influence on such processes would likely reflect input from feedback. Thus, if luminance constraints are implemented by feedback connections, as Albert contended, then data on the speed of lateral versus feedback connections suggest that this information would most likely be part of the initial computations of modal and amodal contours, providing evidence against his suggestion that early interpolation processes do not use such information.
In addition to physiological data, we (Anderson et al., 2002 ) also presented psychophysical data demonstrating that luminance constraints can impact on the kind of objective psychophysical performance tasks that have played such a significant role in Kellman and colleagues' defense of their identity hypothesis. Albert (2007) interpreted the poor performance we observed with our camouflage-inconsistent displays as the consequence of a reduction in the strength of contour completion, which was precisely our motivation for (and interpretation of) these experiments. In contrast, Kellman et al. (2007) contended that our results can be attributed to a cue conflict in our displays (namely, T junctions). This is a strange argument for Kellman et al. (2007) to make, because nothing in their model predicts any difference between the interpolation strengths in these displays: Both L and T junctions have relatable contour segments and both contain tangent discontinuities, so both should generate the same contour interpolation in their model. Moreover, they have argued that performance on similar tasks (e.g., the fat-thin task or their 3-D displacement task) are based on promiscuous contour interpolation processes, so nothing in their model should be affected by such cue conflicts. We nonetheless performed a control experiment to equate (as closely as possible) the junction structure in our different luminance conditions.
3 Kellman et al. (2007) interpreted our use of the term equate in the sense of eliminate, which is incorrect. The sine wave gratings used in both luminance conditions contained vertically oriented luminance gradients that terminated abruptly along the circular apertures, except for the isolated points where the luminance of the grating exactly matched the surround. If both a cue conflict and luminance constraints on camouflage influenced the strength of interpolation, we would expect that both luminance conditions (camouflage consistent and inconsistent) should generate poor performance in the modal case (because of the T-junction cue conflict) but that participants in the camouflage-inconsistent condition should show a larger deficit than those in the camouflage-consistent condition (because it had the additional violation of luminance constraints). This is precisely what we found. Kellman et al.'s (2007) cue conflict explanation accounts for just under half of the magnitude of the effect we observed, so their argument is insufficient to quantitatively account for our results.
Illusory Glass
One of the key pieces of evidence Kellman et al. (2007) upheld to counter our arguments about luminance constraints involves 3 Strictly speaking, it is impossible to completely equate the terminations of the gratings in the two displays. If the luminance of the grating that matches the surround is considered the T-junction stem, then the crossbars of the T junctions would be geometrically identical but photometrically different. Specifically, when the maximum luminance in the sine grating matches the surround, the two sides of the T junction are mirror images of each other, both becoming progressively darker. In the intermediate surround, a midgray value matches the surround, but one side gets progressively lighter and the other becomes progressively darker. Nothing in Kellman and colleagues' model of contour completion (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Kellman et al., 2005) should be influenced by such differences. stereograms that induce percepts of illusory glass that they dub "crystalline interpolations" (p. 492). In such displays, percepts of contours can form without any luminance appearing at the depth of the contours. Albert (2007) agreed that the percepts elicited by these displays are unstable when compared with stimuli that satisfy the conditions of camouflage. In contrast, Kellman et al. (2007) claimed that variants that they present are "very stable" (p. 492). This is a surprising assertion, because these crystalline interpolation displays contain exactly the same cue conflict that Kellman et al. claimed interfered with contour completion in our alignment experiments discussed above (i.e., stereoscopic T junctions where the stem of the T is placed in front of the crossbar). Kellman et al. (2007) contended that contour interpolation occurs unabated in their crystalline displays, whereas in our grating experiments, this very same cue conflict was claimed to interfere with observers' discrimination performance. It would seem that logic requires that one of these claims be wrong.
Despite the importance attributed to such phenomena, Kellman et al. (2007) did not offer any explanation for the glass percepts elicited by these displays. However, my colleagues and I have articulated a general theoretical framework to explain percepts of depth, lightness, and transparency; the glass percepts that emerge in these images are simply a special case of this theory (Anderson, 1997 (Anderson, , 1999 (Anderson, , 2003 Anderson & Julesz, 1995) . We claimed that the visual system treats occlusion and transparency as a continuous dimension in which the opacity (or transmittance) of a near surface varies from completely opaque to perfectly transparent. Specifically, I have argued that the same set of computations is used to determine how surface quality is partitioned between surfaces that span the range from opaque to perfectly transparent (Anderson, 2003) . In this theory, percepts of glass elicited by displays such as those in Figure 2 are simply a degenerate case of a transparent surface in which all of the luminance emanating from the region of transparency is attributed to the more distant surface. Two aspects of illusory glass displays need to be explained by any theory: (a) the formation of illusory contours and (b) why no luminance is attributed to the depth of the near (perfectly transparent) surface. I consider each in turn.
First, consider the illusory contours in these images. An abundance of data demonstrate that binocularly half-occluded contour segments generate percepts of illusory contours (where halfoccluded refers to contour segments of a partially occluded contour that are seen by only one eye; Anderson, 1994; Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Malik et al., 1999; cf. Nakayama & Shimojo, 1990) . Consider the stereograms depicted in Figure 3A . When fused, these images give rise to percepts of glass apertures. To understand what gives rise to the illusory contours in this image, this stereogram can be decomposed into two separate stereograms, one containing the inner segments and one containing the outer segments (see Figures 3B and 3C ). When the inner segments are presented in isolation, they give rise to percepts of four occluding apertures surrounding the black contours; when the outer white line segments are presented in isolation, four occluding blobs appear in front of the contours. The illusory contours in this image arise from binocularly unpaired contour terminators. The inducing contours are shifted along the diagonals in one of the eyes, causing the contour terminators to be vertically offset. This vertical binocular offset causes the terminators of the contours to be binocularly unmatched, which signals a local occlusion relationship (Anderson, 1994 (Anderson, , 1997 Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Malik et al., 1999) . A similar analysis holds for the other stereogram. When these two images are combined into a single image, the unpaired regions of each contour segment remain, both of which signal occlusion but on opposite sides. Note that there are no relatable contours along the paths formed by the illusory contours, so the illusory contours in these images receive no explanation within the theory of Kellman et al. (2005) .
The same source of information is present in Kellman et al.'s (2007) crystalline displays, but the notion of binocularly unpaired is subtler. In simple conditions of occlusion, the notion of unpaired features entails the presence of some feature (i.e., some local contrast or luminance difference) in one eye that is completely absent in the other. In other contexts, the notion of unpaired features can refer to a difference in the contrast or luminance magnitude in the two eyes rather than the presence or absence of a feature (and, as I discuss below, this is a critical insight needed to understand Albert's, 2007 , transparent variant of our stereo cross; Anderson & Julesz, 1995) . In Kellman et al.'s (2007) Figures 2A and 2B are interocular contrast differences along the length of the far contours, and we have previously shown that such contrast differences can give rise to illusory contours of exactly the kind they describe (Anderson & Julesz, 1995 , and see especially Figure 31 therein). Similarly, in Kellman et al.'s (2007) Figure 2C , the unpaired features contained in these figures are exactly analogous to those presented in Figure 3 herein. All of the stereopairs in Kellman et al.'s (2007) Figure 3 also contain unpaired contour segments along the far contours. Despite the demonstrated importance of unpaired features in the synthesis of stereoscopic illusory contours, they play no role in the theory articulated by . Indeed, no data have yet been presented that demonstrate that relatable contours-the near contours in these stereo images-contribute anything to the percepts of illusory contours in these displays. 4 The other aspect of these glass displays that needs to be explained is why the surface appears completely clear. I have recently argued that two principles of perceptual organization are needed to explain how luminance is partitioned into layered representations in conditions of occlusion and transparency, and I have shown that the computations that underlie the formation of layered image representations depend on the contrast and luminance relationships that occur along contours and contour junctions (Anderson, 2003; cf. Anderson, 1999; Anderson et al., 2002) . One principle applies to the sign (or polarity) of local image contrast; the second principle applies to the magnitudes of contrast signals. The constraint on contrast polarity is a principle that applies to all image contrast and was termed the contrast depth asymmetry principle (CDAP). As I explain below, this principle 4 However, this does not imply that the relatable contour segments do not play any role in the illusory contours perceived in these displays. The problem is that it is impossible to generate stereo images that only contain relatable contour segments: All such stereograms will also always contain binocularly unmatched features. This means that some data are needed to show that relatable contour segments contribute additional information beyond that specified by the unmatchable features. No such data currently exist.
underlies some of the core disagreements (and misunderstandings) in the current debate.
The basis for CDAP is the geometry of occlusion: Nearer surfaces occlude more distant surfaces, but the opposite is not true. Consider, for example, a simple occlusion relationship. The CDAP states that the luminance on the two sides of the edge must appear at least as far in depth as the edge, or one side can be more distant (i.e., one side of the edge may be an occluded ground). The intuitive reason for this rule is as follows: For an edge to project to an image, it must do so because there is a luminance difference (or contrast relationship) between two adjacent surfaces or because one surface projects a different luminance than its background. In other words, edges can arise either from events that occur along a surface (e.g., pigmentation changes, illumination changes, or surface folds) or because one side of the edge occludes the other. This implies that when reconstructing surface structure from images, the visual system must assign a depth to both sides of the edge that are at least as distant as the edge (or one side can be a more distant, occluded ground). Thus, relatively far contours must bring the surfaces along both sides of the edge back to at least the depth of the contour, whereas a near edge must only carry a surface along one side of its edge. As we have argued previously, this difference in the way depth is assigned to near and far contours can have significant and sometimes dramatic effects on the surfaces, objects, and contours that form modally and amodally.
Although the CDAP provides significant constraints on how luminance relationships are assigned to depth, it only imposes a constraint on the polarity of these relationships. This is because Figure 3 . A: Illusory glass displays generated in images devoid of relatable contour segments. (In all figures, cross-fusers should fuse the left two images, divergers the right two images.) This stereopair can be construed as two separate stereograms that signal local occlusion relationships. The illusory contours in these images arise from the presence of vertical offsets in the interocular positions of the contour terminators, which cause portions of the contours to be binocularly unpaired. In B, the unpaired contour segments generate percepts of illusory apertures, whereas in C, they generate percepts of occluding blobs over the intersections. When these images are combined, local occlusion signals are present along opposite sides of the aperture, generating percepts of illusory glass. Such unpaired features exist in all of the crystalline displays presented in Kellman et al. (2007) . Adapted from "A Theory of Illusory Lightness and Transparency in Monocular and Binocular Images: The Role of Contour Junctions," by B. L. Anderson, 1997, Perception, 26, pp. 419 -453 . Copyright 1997 by Pion Limited, London. Adapted with permission. transparent surfaces (as well as changes in illumination) preserve the contrast polarity of underlying surfaces and contours. This implies that there is an inherent ambiguity in interpreting any local image contrast (or luminance difference): A given contrast relationship could arise by viewing a scene in plain view or by viewing a higher contrast scene through a contrast-reducing medium. When transparent surfaces are present, luminance must be partitioned between the overlying (transparent) surface and the underlying (partially occluded) surface. But how does the visual system know when a transparent surface is present? I have argued that the visual system contains mechanisms that impose a bias to interpret the highest contrast segment of a contour (or texture) as a region in plain view. In this theory, reductions in contrast magnitude along contour segments of the same polarity signal the presence of transparent media. I called this the transmittance anchoring principle (TAP): The highest contrast regions of contours and textures are treated as transmittance anchors that are perceived in plain view, and the contrast of these anchor regions serves as the normalization factor that is used to compute the transmittance of transparent surfaces in lower contrast regions of the image (Anderson, Singh, & Meng, 2006) .
The CDAP and TAP are capable of providing a complete account of the percepts elicited by all crystalline stereograms (as well as all transparent and opaque variants). Indeed, such percepts fall out naturally from these principles. To see how, consider Figure 3 . The unmatched features present along the thin contours in the image generate the illusory contours that appear in front of the inducing contours. The CDAP states that some of the luminance of the inducing contours must appear at this depth (or one side can appear more distant) to account for the polarity of these edges. Because the contrast polarity of the inducing contours reverses, the TAP applies to both the inner and the outer contour segments, causing both sets of contours to appear in plain view. This means that no luminance is attributed to the near surface, generating a percept of disembodied contours (or, more accurately, a transparent surface with 100% transmittance; see Anderson, 2003) . If the image is changed so that the inducing contours preserve contrast polarity, the TAP predicts that the lower contrast segments should be decomposed into two surfaces (see Figure 4) . The luminance in this lower contrast region is now partitioned between the transparent and underlying surfaces, and the amount of luminance assigned to the near surface is proportional to the perceived contrast reduction of the underlying contour . In the limiting case where the contrast of the underlying contour goes to zero, all of the luminance is attributed to the near surface and occlusion is perceived. Thus, the CDAP and TAP provide a coherent explanation of all of the crystalline stereograms that both Kellman et al. (2007) and Albert (2007) incorrectly uphold as counter-examples to my theoretical views.
5
On What Foundation Should a Unifying Theory of Occlusion Phenomena Be Built?
One of the implicit issues shaping the current debate involves a fundamental disagreement on how to develop a unified theory of occlusion phenomena. The core organizational force underlying Kellman and colleagues' model (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Kellman et al., 2005 ) is a contour completion process, which putatively occurs before other scene constraints shape the final percept. When this model was first introduced, it seemed to integrate a number of phenomena into a common framework. However, during the past 15 years, evidence against this model has continued to accumulate (see above). Recently, a number of proposals have suggested that the computational architecture in models of this kind may be literally backward. A number of newer models incorporate higher level scene information into much earlier stages compared with more traditional, feed-forward models (e.g., Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Lee, Mumford, Romero, & Lamme, 1998; Stanley & Rubin, 2003) . Models of this kind seem to be the primary shaping force behind the model that Albert (2007) sketched. But in such architectures, there is little or no justification for assuming that some initially identical contour interpolation process underlies modal and amodal completion; such high-resolution interpolation processes would be driven by top-down feedback, which contains sufficient information to determine the modal and amodal status of a surface (see, e.g., Stanley & Rubin, 2003) . Although Albert (2007) defended the identity hypothesis, as I show below, it is not even clear whether his model outline actually embodies an identical contour interpolation mech-5 It could be objected that these principles do not account for any interpolation that may be occurring in these displays. However, at this juncture, no data demonstrate that any interpolation is occurring in these displays beyond the local illusory contour induction generated by the binocularly unmatched image contrast. Figure 3A , here the contrast relationships along the contour cause some of the luminance of the inner segments to be attributed to the near (transparent) surface.
anism of the kind suggested by Kellman and colleagues. Indeed, in its current form, Albert's (2007) model merely lists factors that have been shown to influence completion and asserts that they all somehow interact on a metaphorical common playing field to determine how completion occurs.
The theoretical framework that my colleagues and I have been developing treats completion phenomena as a subset of computational problems that involve segmenting images into layered representations, not as a computational module of its own (Anderson, 1999 (Anderson, , 2003 Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Anderson et al., 2002) . We argued that the conditions that elicit modal and amodal completion are merely special cases of a broad class of problems that arise in reconstructing scenes in conditions of occlusion (which includes partial occlusion by transparent surfaces). Two aspects of our theory are relevant from the perspective of the current debate. First, as discussed above, we argued that the visual system treats occlusion as a continuous dimension that spans the range from opaque surfaces to completely transmissive surfaces and, hence, we claimed that the same basic processes are involved in computations of occlusion and transparency. Second, our theory asserts that there are fundamental asymmetries in the information contained in near versus relatively far image contrast (most notably in the CDAP and the TAP described above). The first aspect of our theory asserts that the difference between occluding and transparent surfaces is a matter of degree, not kind; the second part asserts that near and far surfaces impose distinct constraints on interpolation processes that are responsible for differences in modal and amodal completion.
The first point underlies Albert's (2007) misunderstanding of the significance of our stereo-cross asymmetry. Our theory asserts that when a near surface is opaque, all of the luminance is attributed to the near (occluding) surface; when the near surface is transparent, luminance is partitioned between the transparent and underlying layers. In our theory, the difference is one of degree, not kind, and the same interpolation processes are assumed to be responsible for the depth perceived in both displays. Consider the images depicted in Figure 5 (Anderson & Winawer, 2006; cf. Anderson & Winawer, 2003 , 2005 . In Figure 5A , the checkered regions within the circular apertures are physically identical, yet the image on the left appears as a series of black disks on a gray background visible through partially transmissive white checks; in the image on the right, white disks appear to lie on a gray background visible through partially transmissive black checks. In Figure 5B , an essentially identical percept is evoked in a comparable occlusion display, except the black and white checks (respectively) now appear completely opaque. Identical effects can be observed in stereoscopic displays (such as our grating stimuli), but in such displays, the decomposition into layers was induced by introducing a disparity difference between the surround and the target (Anderson, 1999; Anderson et al., 2002) .
How are such phenomena to be understood, and what is their relationship to modal and amodal completion? One set of images involves amodal completion and the other does not, so Albert's (2007) line of argument with our stereo cross (Anderson & Julesz, 1995) suggests that he believes that there are fundamental differences in the computations responsible for the percepts in these different displays. In contradistinction, I contend that these phenomena are matters of degree, not kind, and can be understood in a unifying manner using the two principles described above (i.e., the CDAP and the TAP). Consider first Figure 5A . In this image, the highest contrast contour segments serve as anchors that are perceived as regions in plain view. For the image on the left, the dark circular contour segments on the gray checks appear in plain view; for the image on the right, the light portions of the circular contour that lie on the gray checks appear in plain view. The lower contrast contour segments appear partially obscured by a transparent layer, and the luminance in these regions is partitioned between the two surfaces in depth. Our theory asserts that the CDAP causes both sides of the higher contrast contour segments to appear in the distant depth plane, and the TAP determines which portions of the scene are partially obscured by a transparent layer (which must appear in front of the higher contrast segments). In Figure 5B , a similar analysis holds, except now portions of the circular contour segments are completely obscured. In our theory, the same computational substrate is used to group the contours in the transparent stimulus into a common depth plane and to connect the missing contour segments in the occlusion display.
Albert's (2007) arguments about our stereo cross (Anderson & Julesz, 1995) suggest that he believes that modal and amodal completion should be treated as being qualitatively distinct from the computations that underlie the segmentation and interpolation processes that arise in conditions of transparency. He showed that similar interpolation asymmetries can be observed with both occluding and transparent variants of the stereo-cross stimulus and then concluded that this implies that the difference in stability we originally reported (Anderson & Julesz, 1995) is unlikely to be due to differences in modal or amodal completion processes. Albert's argument hinges on the assumption that the 3-D interpolation of contour segments across a gap (as putatively occurs during modal and amodal completion) is fundamentally different from the 3-D interpolation of depth along ambiguous visible contours. In other words, Albert's assertion that this asymmetry does not reveal anything about the mechanisms of completion hinges on a tacit assumption that the mechanisms of completion are fundamentally different than the mechanisms underlying transparency computations. In contradistinction, our theory treats the computation of occlusion and transparency as part of the same basic process (Anderson & Julesz, 1995) . We have suggested that the near and far horizontal bars have different interpolation biases (and stabilities) because of the difference in the frequency with which partially camouflaged and partially occluded surfaces are encountered in nature. To perceive the horizontal bars in the fronto-parallel plane, the visual system must decompose the horizontal contours into regions that are visible to both eyes (that are binocularly matched) and segments that are visible to only one eye (that are binocularly unmatched). Binocularly unmatched features arise generically in conditions of occlusion but occur much less frequently in conditions of camouflage (because of the greater set of coincidences needed to generate perfect camouflage). We argued (Anderson, 2003; Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Anderson et al., 2002) that the asymmetry in the way depth is interpolated in these displays arose because the visual system was more likely to decompose the horizontal contours into matchable and unmatchable features when it was an occluded bar than when it was the occluding bar. Our theory predicts that the asymmetry should generalize to transparent stimuli because there are still substantial differences in the contrast (or component luminance values) along the horizontal contours that must be matched for the horizontal bar to appear in front of or behind the vertical bar.
In sum, the same kind of (unmatched) features are present in the occlusion display and the transparent cross, so our theory asserts that the same effect should be observed in both displays (Anderson, 2003; Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Anderson et al., 2002 ). Albert's (2007) data are in complete agreement with this prediction. Indeed, the only explanation of the effect he offered is a trivial variant of the explanation we originally offered, lending further credence to our explanation of this effect. 
Surface-Level Asymmetries in Unit Formation
The CDAP expresses an inviolable constraint on the depth and ordinal lightness relationships of all local image contrast (or lu-6 Albert's (2007) only modification of our account was to suggest that it is not the contrast differences of the mismatched portions of the horizontal contours that cause the asymmetry but, rather, any interocular luminance difference. The structure of our explanation is unchanged by this suggestion. Moreover, given that there is currently no general measure of contrast that captures perceived contrast, Albert's suggestion may also only apply to the particular (unspecified) definition of contrast he used in his experiment. Figure 5 . Images illustrating how the same computational principles are involved in computing layered representations in conditions of transparency and occlusion. A: The textures within the circular contours images on the left and right are identical. In both the left and right images, the high-contrast regions of the circular contour appear in plain view, and the lower contrast regions appear partially obscured by transparent checks. However, the regions that form the highest contrast boundaries within the circular arcs are inverted in the left and right image, which inverts the perceived lightness of the two figures. B: The same effect is observed when the contrast along portions of the contour go to zero. I have argued that the same set of computations are involved in the perceptual organization of A and B, which implies that the same asymmetries observed in the occluding version of the stereo cross should occur with the transparent variant of the display, which is what Albert (2007) reported. minance differences). It is not simply a useful principle for analyzing some untextured stereograms (as Albert, 2007, suggested) but, rather, applies to the interpretation of all local image contrast (i.e., all contours, texture, illumination differences, or luminance gradients). In the context of completion phenomena, the CDAP is responsible for a variety of asymmetries in unit formation that occur when relative depth is inverted. The importance of this principle for the present debate is that it states that relative depth determines what elements participate in the completion process, which in turn constrains what is interpolated. A host of phenomena demonstrate that Kellman and Shipley's (1991) claim that perceptual units do not change during modal-amodal transformations is incorrect, even the very demonstrations that motivated their original theory (e.g., Kanizsa figures). In our star demonstration (Anderson, Singh, & Fleming, 2002, p. 167, Figure 11 ), the shift was even more dramatic, because it involved a substantial change in what was perceived as the figure in the modal-amodal shift: In the modal variant, the V-shaped portions of the inducing elements appeared as five separate occluding wedges, whereas the amodal variant appeared as a single star-shaped object on a white background. Despite these clear changes in perceived surface structure, Albert (2007) asserted that "the changes in perceived surface structure in Figure 3a [our star stereogram] are not a consequence of the transformation from modal to amodal" (p. 457). He then showed that similar star-shaped surfaces can be generated modally if the stimulus is changed and, on this basis, asserted that such demonstrations provide evidence for a surface-level identity hypothesis.
I agree with Albert (2007) that transformations in perceived surface structure can be observed in a host of Gestalt phenomena, including Rubin's classic vase-face demonstration. We made this argument previously when we noted that this insight contradicted claims in Kellman and Shipley's (1991) original model:
A theory that asserts the identity of "units" based solely on the shapes of interpolated contours ignores the transformation in structure that can accompany shifts in border assignment. Rubin's classic face-vase demonstration as well as the host of Gestalt figure-ground displays all attest to the role of surface level representations in shaping the interpretation of contours and the dramatic transformations in the perceived shapes of surfaces and objects that can accompany such shifts. (Anderson et al., 2002, p. 168) Although we agree on the relevance of classic figure-ground reversals on theories of unit formation, it seems that Albert has either misinterpreted the significance of our star demonstration (Anderson et al., 2002, p. 167, Figure 11 ) or has invoked a completely different sense of identity than that used by Kellman and colleagues. The identity hypothesis-as introduced by Kellman and Shipley (1991)-asserts that an identical interpolation mechanism is responsible for the formation of units, and relative depth determines whether the units take on a modal or an amodal appearance. Thus, a surface-level identity hypothesis requires that the same surfaces should form in the modal and amodal variants of the same display, which does not occur in our original star demonstration. Albert's proposed surface-level identity hypothesis cannot explain this result. Albert noted that it is possible to generate similar-shaped surfaces in a different display than the one we presented and concluded that this implies the existence of identical modal and amodal surface interpolation mechanisms. The demonstrations he offered have been presented previously (Anderson, 1995; see Figure 6 ) alongside the demonstrations that appeared subsequently in Anderson et al. (2002) , but they do not provide evidence for an identity hypothesis. Consider the transparent versions of our star display (Figure 6 ). The near surface appears as an unbounded transparent star in front of five black disks on a white background. When depth is reversed, the star appears amodally, and the five disks merge into a unified white background. Just as with the Kanizsa figure, inverting the relative depth in these images causes substantial differences in how depth is assigned to the regions bordering the near and far contours (due to the CDAP), which changes the number and shapes of the surfaces that form. Albert never explained how a surface-level identity hypothesis can account for the different surfaces formed in this demonstration or, even more important, our original demonstration where the surfaces that form differ so dramatically. Albert's (2007) arguments may arise from misunderstanding the significance of asymmetries in modal and amodal completion phenomena and how they bear on the identity hypothesis. My Figure 6 . The original example of the transparent variants of the star demonstration (Anderson, 1995) . For the transparent condition, cross-fusers should fuse the left two images; divergers, the right two. When fused, a modal star-shaped figure is seen in both modal and amodal configurations. colleagues and I have not claimed that there are no commonalities in the conditions that elicit completion for modal and amodal configurations or that similar shapes cannot be generated by modal and amodal interpolation processes. My invention of the modal and amodal variants of the star display was largely inspired to demonstrate that relatable contours were not necessary for either modal or amodal completion. However, in the figure we published (Anderson et al., 2002, p. 167, Figure 11 ), the transformation in perceived surface structure during the modal-amodal switch provided evidence that the shift in relative depth-and, hence, the modal and amodal status of a figure-can cause dramatic changes in the units that form, in direct opposition to the claims made by Kellman and Shipley (1991) . The important point of this demonstration is that it shows that relative depth is not merely a space into which completed figures are placed, as proposed in Kellman and Shipley (1991) , but rather that relative depth can alter what is interpolated and the units that form.
In further support of this view, we showed that shapes of interpolated contours can also be transformed by inverting relative depth. Our serrated-edge display (Anderson et al., 2002, p. 184, Figure 19) showed that the same contour geometry generated very different contour interpolations when the relative depth in the images was inverted. Kellman et al. (2007) mentioned that issues of border ownership might (somehow) interact with surface spreading to cause this effect, but they did not provide any explanation of how such interactions could actually generate the shape differences observed in these displays (or how this impacts on the importance of this demonstration for the identity hypothesis). Albert (2007) agreed with our claim that different shapes are generated in our serrated-edge display but contended that this difference does not contradict the identity hypothesis. Albert constructed a variant of our serrated-edge display by altering some of the luminance relationships in the image and reported that this change leads to the same interpolations in the modal and amodal cases (i.e., no serrated edge is formed in either the modal or the amodal case). He suggested that the shift in interpolation we observed in our display arose from a shift in the border ownership of modal and amodal variants. This is an interesting idea, and it is identical to an explanation I suggested in my previous article (see Anderson, 2007, p. 473) . Although I agree that border ownership may play a role in the different interpolations that we observed, I disagree with the logic that led Albert to conclude that this alters the significance of this demonstration for the identity hypothesis. The model articulated by Kellman and colleagues stated that there is some stage where contours are interpolated identically prior to the influence of surface properties such as border ownership. In Albert's model, it is impossible to tell whether a distinct border ownership mechanism (or module) influences a separate contour interpolation mechanism or whether they are both part of a single mechanism. The only way the identity hypothesis could be upheld in the serrated-edge display is if the initial interpolation of boundaries was identical and the effects of surface properties such as border ownership occurred only after this stage via some interaction with this boundary mechanism (which is precisely the model offered by Kellman et al., 2007 ). Albert's model asserts that all of the influences on completion (e.g., contour geometry, luminance constraints, and border ownership) compete on the "same playing field" (Albert, 2007, p. 463) to determine completion. This model is too ill-specified to determine whether this metaphorical common playing field actually instantiates an identity hypothesis in the sense of that applied by Kellman and colleagues. If the relative depth of a contour shifts border ownership and border ownership is an intrinsic part of the contour completion mechanism, then there would be no stage where the contours for the modal and amodal displays were represented identically, which is needed to sustain the identity hypothesis. Indeed, a growing body of data shows that contour interpolation processes are intrinsically tied to the surfaces to which they belong. Contours that belong to convex surfaces generate different interpolations than do the same contours that belong to concave surfaces (Fantoni, Bertamini, & Gerbino, 2005) . Medial axis geometry and part decomposition have also been shown to alter the shapes of interpolated contours (Fulvio & Singh, 2006) . If surface properties are not separable from the contour interpolation mechanisms and shifts in surface properties (such as border ownership) can be induced by changing relative depth, then the modal or amodal status of contours can alter the shape of interpolated contours, which contradicts the identity hypothesis.
One source of confusion surrounding this point of debate is that Albert (2007) appears to use the term identity in a different manner than that proposed by Kellman and colleagues (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991 ). Albert's argument is that it is border ownership, not the modal or amodal status per se, that causes the shift observed in the shape of interpolated contours in our display. His variant of our demonstration does provide evidence for the importance of border ownership in the serrated-edge effect. However, if border ownership influences contour completion from the outset, Albert's data contradict the claim that the initial contour interpolation process depends only on the local geometry of the inducing contours, as Kellman and colleagues asserted. As I stated above, the key source of disagreement concerns the role of relative depth in interpolation phenomena. In Kellman and Shipley's (1991) original model, interpolation was determined by image properties, and relative depth simply determined how interpolated figures were placed in a 3-D representation. In their recent model , relative depth plays a critical role in completion, but only in determining what constitutes relatable contours. I contend that relative depth plays a much more significant role in completion phenomena. In particular, relative depth can cause changes in border ownership (as occurs in our original star demonstration; Anderson et al., 2002, p. 167, Figure 11) , the surfaces available for completion, and the units that form during such completion processes.
In addition to confusion about the issues under debate, there are also problems with the explanation Albert offered for the serratededge illusion (and its relationship to other displays he considered). Albert's (2007) explanation of the serrated-edge demonstration contains three parts. First, he claimed that the border ownership of standard figure-ground displays is ambiguous, but the visual system exhibits a bias to resolve border ownership in a manner that causes smaller regions to be perceived as a figure. Second, he claimed that for our serrated-edge display, "border ownership is unambiguously specified by binocular disparity" (Albert, 2007, p. 457) . Third, he asserted that border ownership exerts its influence on contour completion because the visual system contains "a bias to resolve the interpolation ambiguity in favor of creating smaller figural regions" (Albert, 2007, p. 457) . There are a number of problems with this proposed explanation. First, binocular disparity only unambiguously resolves the border ownership of the near contours in all of these displays; the far contours remain inherently ambiguous (due to the CDAP). Second, Albert's proposal that there is a bias for the visual system to interpolate smaller figural regions is contradicted by our star demonstration (Anderson et al., 2002) . The border ownership of the far contours in the star stimuli, like the serrated-edge display, is inherently ambiguous. If there was a general bias for the visual system to interpret smaller regions as figural, both the modal and the amodal variants of the star display should appear as five separate occluding wedges (i.e., the amodal figure should not appear as a unified star, because it requires a much larger region to be seen as a figure) . This is not what observers report. Finally, unless Albert asserts that the original contour interpolation process in the serrated-edge display is determined solely by local contour geometry (i.e., by the relatability criteria), Albert's own explanation contradicts the identity hypothesis proposed by Kellman and colleagues (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991) .
Finally, it should be noted that neither Kellman et al. (2007) nor Albert (2007) accounted for the substantial shape differences reported by Singh (2004) , who used displays that did not involve shifts in border ownership. Kellman et al. (2007) suggested that Singh's effects are not large enough to challenge the identity hypothesis, but they incorrectly estimated the largest difference in the modal and amodal shapes Singh reported as 8 arc min; the actual figure is over a half a degree.
7 Moreover, it should be noted that this method of estimating the magnitude of the effect is relatively arbitrary (i.e., by measuring the vertical offset of the contour) and underestimates the actual shape differences observers report (see Figure 7) . Kellman et al. (2007) also misportrayed the extent of agreement between Singh's position and their own. Singh stated, "The presence of systematic shape differences between modal and amodal completion contradicts the currently held version of the identity hypothesis-namely, that mechanisms of contour interpolation operate independently of completion type" (Singh, 2004, p. 458) . The currently held version of the identity hypothesis is the one proposed and defended by Kellman and colleagues. If the mechanisms of contour completion depend on completion type or on relative depth, then the identity hypothesis that Kellman and colleagues have proposed is incorrect.
Methodological Issues in Evaluating Completion Phenomena
One of the most important issues that arises in the evaluation of theories involves assessing the experimental methodologies that provide their empirical justification. In my previous article (Anderson, 2007) , I argued that recent data from Kellman and colleagues' own lab strongly challenges the view that objective methods such as the fat-thin task provide a means of evaluating the structure of the representations underlying contour completion. Kellman et al. (2007) asserted that I rejected objective methods outright, which is incorrect. They also contended that "the fat-thin paradigm, we believe, is one of the best-validated methods in our field" (Kellman et al., 2007, p. 499 ), but they did not address the specific data that were the basis of my arguments against this claim. To avoid further misunderstanding, I present the pertinent data here.
The methods used in the experiments of Guttman and Kellman (2005) required observers to classify a figure as fat or thin on the basis of the rotations of the inducing elements (i.e., forming convex vertical edges or concave vertical edges; see Ringach & Shapley, 1996) . They used a number of different display types to assess the dependence of discrimination on completion strength, including standard Kanizsa figures, outline Kanizsa figures, hybrid displays (containing a mixture of filled and outline inducers), simple line segments (forming L-shaped inducers), and occluded 7 I thank M. Singh for providing these values and Figure 4 . This number refers to the sum of the difference in the vertical offset of the two contours in this display (i.e., the offset of each individual modal and amodal contour was perceived to differ by a maximum value of approximately 15 arc min). Figure 7 . A schematic depiction of the shape differences observed in Singh's (2004) experiments. A: The mean modal and amodal contour shape differences are superimposed. The gray region corresponds to the more angular amodal responses, the black to the modal responses. B: Same as A, but the two shapes are separated for ease of viewing (top is amodal, bottom is modal).
figures. Space limitations preclude a discussion of all of their experiments, so I focus on those that provide the clearest evidence that the fat-thin paradigm is both insensitive to completion strength and affected by task strategies. One experiment compared participants' performance between filled, outline, and hybrid stimuli, using either relatable or nonrelatable (horizontally offset) contour segments. As can be seen in Figure 8 , no difference in performance was observed for any of the displays containing relatable contours, despite clear differences in the perceived strength of completion. An identical pattern of results was obtained when comparing filled Kanizsa inducers with L-shaped inducers (see Figure 9 ). This result is clearly at odds with the model advocated by Kellman and colleagues (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Kellman et al., 2005) , because the L-shaped inducers lack tangent discontinuities and should not produce any completion according to their model. In another experiment, Guttman and Kellman (2005) compared discrimination performance between outline Kanizsa figures and filled Kanizsa inducers. When the outline condition was performed before the filled condition, performance was better for the Kanizsa figures ( Figure 10A ). However, when the filled inducer condition was performed first, discrimination accuracy for the outline condition was as good as it was in the filled condition ( Figure 10B ). This finding provides compelling evidence that the fat-thin method is highly sensitive to task strategies. Indeed, it shows that such strategies can completely obscure differences in perceived completion strength.
It would seem that the most parsimonious interpretation of these results is that performance on the fat-thin task is not modulated by the strength or occurrence of completion, at least not in any simple manner that allows it to be used as a diagnostic tool for measuring contour completion. However, Kellman et al. (2005 Kellman et al. ( , 2007 Guttman & Kellman, 2005) claimed that these results demonstrate that contour interpolation occurs for all relatable contour segments, even those lacking tangent discontinuities (such as the L-shaped inducers). They defend this promiscuous contour interpolation hypothesis by comparing stimuli containing relatable contour segments with those that are geometrically offset. There are many reasons to believe that judgments of relative orientation should be more difficult in these offset conditions than in relatable displays without invoking contour completion processes (see Anderson, 2007) . Indeed, Kellman and colleagues previously expressed similar concerns about comparing relatable and nonrelatable contour stimuli when attempting to assess contour completion:
An ideal control group would be one in which the boundaries relevant to the fat-thin detection task could be kept in identical positions in the experimental and control groups. . . .
To compare displays that should and should not show figural completion effects while keeping visible contours in the same location, we used illusory contour-type displays made of outline inducing elements. Illusory contours are weak or absent in displays made of outline inducers. (Kellman, Yin, & Shipley, 1998, p. 864). My views are in greater agreement with Kellman et al.'s (1998) previous views than their more recent experiments that inspired their promiscuous contour interpolation hypothesis. It would seem more prudent to conclude that the fat-thin method is not sufficiently sensitive to contour completion processes to be used as a diagnostic tool for its measurement than to conclude that contour interpolation occurs equally in a set of displays that yield very different percepts of completion.
Finally, it should be noted that Kellman et al. (2007) argued that some recent methodologies, such as classification image studies, provide strong validation for the fat-thin task as providing a method for studying completion processes. Indeed, they critiqued my "vague invocations of 'grouping' and 'task strategies'" (p. 499) to explain their data and cited work by Gold and colleagues (Gold, Murray, Bennett, & Sekuler, 2000; Gold & Shubel, 2006) as some of the strongest evidence that validates the fat-thin method as a means of studying completion. It should be noted, however, that Kellman et al. (2007) failed to acknowledge that Gold and Shubel (2006) expressed exactly the same cautionary note in interpreting the results of classification image studies that underlie my concerns with the fat-thin methodology:
However, it is worth noting that, strictly speaking, a classification image does not necessarily reflect the properties of an observer's visual representation of a pattern. What it does reflect is the spatial strategy or "template" used by an observer to recognize a pattern or set of patterns. (p. 357) My critique of the fat-thin task is not a general indictment of using objective methods to assess the processes underlying per- Figure 10 . An experiment from Guttman and Kellman (2005) revealing the critical role of order effects in discrimination performance on the fat-thin task. Kanizsa figures were compared with outline Kanizsa figures. As shown in A, when the conditions were blocked and the outline figures were performed first, the Kanizsa figures were discriminated more accurately than were the outline figures. However, if the order was reversed as shown in B, the outline inducers were discriminated with equal accuracy as the filled inducers, suggesting that any differences in completion strength can be completely overridden by task strategies. ceptual organization. My argument is that the existing data that have emerged during ongoing work using this task provide clear evidence that this method is not sensitive to differences in perceived completion strength and, hence, should not be used to support an idea as speculative as a promiscuous contour interpolation hypothesis.
Conclusions
I have argued, both here and in my previous commentary (Anderson, 2007) , that Kellman and colleagues' model (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Kellman et al., 2005 ) makes a number of incorrect predictions. Their model predicts that the shapes of contour interpolations should be unaffected by the inversion of the relative depth relationships of figures; they have claimed that perceptual units (such as surfaces) do not change during modalamodal shifts; and they predicted that contours that are initially amodal in appearance should be able to emerge as modal contours. All of these predictions, as well as others, have been falsified. I have also argued that there is now clear data that one of the methods that they have used to uphold their model-the fat-thin task-is both insensitive to differences in interpolation strength and is sensitive to task demands and, hence, cannot be used to make inferences about the presence, absence, or strength of completion. Albert (2007) rejected the feed-forward model proposed by Kellman and colleagues (e.g., Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Kellman et al., 2005) but defended the claim that an identical contour interpolation process underlies modal and amodal completion. I have argued here that the data Albert presented actually provide further evidence against the model proposed by Kellman et al. (2005 Kellman et al. ( , 2007 and does not invalidate the arguments that we made on the basis of the displays that motivated Albert's experiments (Anderson & Julesz, 1995; Anderson et al., 2002) . The experimental data that Albert presented make little contact with the model outline he sketched, and some of his proposed explanations do not generalize to the other displays he considered. And, like Kellman and colleagues, Albert (2007) incorrectly asserted that completion mechanisms can switch between types (i.e., amodal and modal).
In concluding, I agree with Kellman et al.'s (2005) suggestion that the transition from a 2-D image-based completion model to a representational medium that contains information about relative depth requires some radical changes in model structure. The CDAP and the TAP are just two examples of the kind of theoretical changes that are needed to address the computational issues that arise in recovering the properties of surfaces and objects in a 3-D world.
Postscript: Filling-In Models of Completion Barton L. Anderson University of New South Wales
In my initial commentary (Anderson, 2007a) , I focused on the psychophysical data that provided evidence that relatable contours were neither necessary nor sufficient to predict contour interpolation and on evidence against the Kellman and colleagues' identity hypothesis. In their replies, Kellman, Garrigan, Shipley, and Keane (2007a) and Albert (2007a) asserted that certain phenomena contradicted my views, most notably crystalline displays and crossing interpolation displays. I therefore focused my rejoinder (Anderson, 2007b) on demonstrating that the relevance of these phenomena in challenging my views is incorrect and articulated the theoretical principles that are missing from Kellman and colleagues' model (e.g., Kellman, Garrigan, & Shipley, 2005; Kellman & Shipley, 1991) that are needed to understand such phenomena. In their postscript, Kellman, Garrigan, Shipley, and Keane (2007b) claimed that my position has changed and that some of my arguments have been abandoned. This is simply incorrect. Nothing in their replies significantly challenges my previous critiques of their model. Data now demonstrate that relatability criteria can be violated and completion nonetheless occurs (see Anderson, 2007b) ; that completion does not occur simply from the presence of relatable contours (as their promiscuous contour interpolation process asserts); and that relative depth imposes asymmetric constraints on how surfaces and contours are processed, which in turn underlie differences in how modal and amodal completion and/or continuation occur. Despite repeated assertions by Kellman et al., I have never claimed that luminance constraints block modal completion; rather, they merely weaken it, a fact that was discussed repeatedly since my first theoretical article on the topic (Anderson & Julesz, 1995 ; see also Anderson, 1997 Anderson, , 2003 Anderson, , 2007a Anderson, , 2007b . On this issue, in his postscript, Albert (2007b) incorrectly asserted that my theoretical views do not predict that contours in glass (or crystalline) displays should be weaker. He failed to appreciate that my theory uses both binocular and monocular information and that both contribute to the construction of illusory surfaces and contours. In luminance conditions that do not support transparency, binocular and monocular information are in conflict (only binocular information signals their presence), which readily accounts for the weakened appearance of these contours. In their postscript, Kellman et al. (2007b) now concede that luminance constraints weaken contour completion and that this is consistent with their views, despite their claim in their previous reply (Kellman et al., 2007a ) that contour completion was unimpeded in their crystalline displays. It is difficult to understand how to reconcile these inconsistencies.
Much of the defense of Kellman et al.'s position in their postscript is articulated in the form of arguments by assertion. Kellman et al. (2007b) assert that quasi-modal completion occurs, they assert that the fat-thin paradigm has been demonstrated to be sensitive to interpolation, and they assert that they have demonstrated that modal contours are amodally interpolated under occluding surfaces. I have argued that all of these assertions are false. For example, their claim about the existence of quasi-modal completion rests on two kinds of data: their phenomenology and performance on the fat-thin paradigm. The data that they provided from Guttman and Kellman (2005) showed that performance using outline stimuli is worse when observers do not receive any trials with filled Kanisza figures. However, when such trials are intermingled, performance on the outline figures is elevated to the level of the filled figures. How can such effects be understood on the basis of interpolation? Kellman and colleagues would have to claim that the interpolation of contours in outline figures was somehow enhanced by exposure to filled figures to uphold their claim that this method taps into (unseen) interpolation processes. A simpler explanation is that once observers see the illusory figure in the filled inducer conditions, they realize that the task can be performed by imposing a mental (square) template on all figures with relatable contours (i.e., with figures that can be treated as deformations of a square template). Such strategies would obviously not work with misaligned or rotated inducers, so these control conditions do not provide any means of distinguishing between a template model of this kind or the interpolation model favored by Kellman and colleagues. In addressing the failure to observe modal contours emerging from behind occluders, Kellman
